Freedom-types and life satisfaction: empirical Evidence on the Role of Individual and Civic-Oriented Values

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between four freedom orientations—libertarian, utilitarian, civic-oriented, and communitarian—and subjective well-being. We conceptualize liberty orientations as varying in their prioritization of individual autonomy relative to the general interest referring to political philosophers. Using nationally representative survey data, we estimate a recursive generalized structural equation model (GSEM) with instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity between liberty orientations and well-being. Falsification tests confirm the validity of our instruments. The results indicate that civic oriented and communitarian orientations are positively and significantly associated with higher levels of life satisfaction compared to libertarian and utilitarian orientations. These findings suggest that value systems emphasizing voluntary alignment with, or prioritization of, the general interest foster higher well-being, consistent with research strands highlighting the importance of social relationships, generativity, and collective purpose discussed in our paper. Our contribution is both theoretical, by refining the typology of liberty orientations, and empirical, by providing causal evidence of their effects on subjective well-being.

Keywords: Liberty orientations; life satisfaction; subjective well-being; individual autonomy; collectivism; relational intelligence; generalized structural equation model

JEL Codes: I31 – General Welfare, Well-Being; D91 – Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving; Z13 – Economic Sociology; Social Norms and Values; H41 – Public Goods

1. Introduction

Mainstream economics draw the individual as homo economicus aiming to maximize its utility/happiness under income, time and technological constraints. The homo economics is rational (consistently matches effort and strategies with ends) and self-regarding (at least in most basic models where other-regarding arguments are not included among preferences). Implied concepts of freedom embedded in these models refer to libertarianism (focus on individual freedom not accepting to be constrained by general interest) or utilitarianism (focus on individual freedom accepting some over imposed limits in the general interest).

Our research hypothesis highlights a paradox.

The anthropological model used by mainstream economics to maximise happiness cannot achieve its utility maximisation goal since libertarians and utilitarians are significantly less satisfied by their life than civic oriented or communitarian individuals, that is individuals who deliberately orient or subordinate their freedom to the general interest. In our research hypothesis we argue that this occurs for two reasons. First, life satisfaction empirical literature emphasizes how relational goods, sense of life and generativity (impact on life of others) are crucial for subjective wellbeing (Becchetti et al. 2008). Second, life is made of social dilemmas (formalized by game theory in prisoner's dilemma, trust investment games, traveller's games,…) where *homines economici* lack of sufficient empathy and "relational intelligence" (gift giving attitude, trust, reciprocity, trustworthiness…) needed to achieve through cooperation superior socially optimal outcomes and, by contrast, end up being trapped in suboptimal Nash equilibria of games with social dilemmas (Basu, 1994; Berg at al. 1995). As a consequence, homines economici with libertarian and utilitarian concepts of freedom end up with poorer relational and social outcomes which significantly reduce their life satisfaction.

Empirical findings of our paper do not reject our research hypothesis. Libertarian and utilitarian individuals are significantly less satisfied about their life than civic oriented or communitarians. They also show descriptively to have lower education and reduced civic engagement. We use Bartik instrument and generalized structural equation modelling in our identification strategy to address endogeneity concerns. Our instruments are relevant and valid as shown by falsification tests. Overall, we find that being libertarian or utilitarian reduces by more than 10 percent the probability of being very satisfied (life satisfaction higher than 6 on a 0-10 scale).

2. Classification of the four types and references with the literature

In order to evaluate the relationship between freedom conception and subjective wellbeing we identify four liberty types—libertarian, utilitarian, civic oriented, and communitarian— which can represent useful benchmarks in the longstanding philosophical debates about the relationship between individual freedom and the general interest. More specifically, we propose to participants to a survey to choose one among four statements and classify

i) as libertarians the individuals choosing the following statement *"a society is just if individual freedom is always guaranteed, even if this could go against the general interest"*,

ii) as utilitarians the individuals choosing the statement *"a society is just if individual freedom is guaranteed, provided it does not conflict with the general interest",*

iii) as self-oriented civics the individuals choosing the statement *"a society is just if individual freedom is intentionally directed towards achieving the general interest"*

iv) as communitarians the individuals choosing the statement *"a society is just if individual freedom is always subordinated to the general interest"*

The taxonomy of the four freedom types is therefore based on different positions related to the relative prevalence of individual freedom over general interest. Libertarians are placed at the extreme of

individual freedom on an ideal line moving from it to the general interest, as they do not consider fair that their freedom be limited by the general interest. They therefore regard as appropriate absence of intervention on individual freedom also in case of conflict with the general interest. Utilitarians are close but moving a little bit in the direction of the general interest since they consider fair the limit of the general interest to their individual freedom. Civic oriented move more toward the opposite extreme of general interest since they regard that societal justice equilibrium is attained when individuals voluntarily decide to address their freedom toward the general interest. Communitarians are at the opposite extreme of libertarians since they regard as fair subordination of their freedom to the general interest. At the individual freedom extreme of the segment prevails the "freedom of", while at the general interest extreme the "freedom for" (intended as freedom oriented to the general interest).

Each orientation can be partially referred to distinct traditions in political philosophy. We mention here, moving from relatively higher emphasis on individual freedom to that on general interest. We are aware that the thought of none of the mentioned authors can be fully framed in our definition, but we believe that their reflections can be helpful to enrich and discuss characteristics of the different types.

The libertarian view can find inspiration in philosophers putting more emphasis on individual freedom than on general interest. This view, rooted in classical liberal thought, is most famously articulated by John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty* (1859) (even though has expressed different opinions in his intellectual life including praise for cooperation). Mill's harm principle asserts: *"The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant"* (Mill, 1859, p. 14). He further emphasized the sovereignty of the individual: *"Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign"* (p. 23).

Robert Nozick (1974) advanced a more radical libertarian vision in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, arguing for a strictly minimal state whose sole function is to protect individual rights to life, liberty, and property: *"The minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified"* (Nozick, 1974, p. ix). Nozick's provocative claim that *"Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor"* (p. 169) encapsulates the libertarian rejection of collective interventions for the sake of the general interest.

Another influential libertarian voice is Friedrich Hayek, whose work *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960) articulates a vision of freedom as non-coercion, particularly from centralized state power. Hayek warns that efforts to impose collective aims—such as distributive justice or equality—undermine spontaneous order and individual autonomy. In his framework, justice does not arise from outcomes but from respecting a system of rules that protect individual choice. Hayek regards state interventions for the sake of a vaguely defined "general interest" as inherently dangerous. His defence of markets, property, and voluntary association places him squarely in the libertarian camp as conceptualized in our typology.

Libertarianism may thus be summarized in one sentence: "Every individual is sovereign over their life, liberty, and property; no one may infringe these rights without their free and voluntary consent." In Nozick's framework, every person owns themselves and the fruits of their labor, meaning that their

bodies, choices, and possessions cannot be seized or used by others without voluntary agreement, even though for what can be considered general interest. Individuals enjoy absolute protection from aggression—whether through violence, theft, or fraud—and are free to enter into contracts and associations entirely on their own terms. Property may be justly acquired through initial appropriation or voluntary transfer, and all holdings thus obtained remain inviolable so long as "enough and as good" is left for others. The only legitimate role of the state is to enforce these rights; any further coercive redistribution or regulation violates individual self-ownership and liberty.

From this perspective, individual rights are the foundation of justice and must never be violated—regardless of collective interests, aggregate utility, or the common good.

Based on these considerations, according to libertarians as defined in our research, *general interest going beyond the mere avoidance of harming each other should not prevail over individual freedom.* An example not consistent with libertarian values is clearly government seizing private property (with compensation) for the realisation of something unrelated with other people harm but with general interest that requires a sacrifice of individual freedom (ie. a public transport infrastructure that necessarily must pass through a given individual property). Legal examples of it are eminent domain in US legislation, compulsory purchase regulated by the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 in the UK, Expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique in France (latest consolidated version: Ordonnance n° 2014-1345 du 6 novembre 2014, updated by Décret n° 2015-1702 du 18 décembre 2015). or "esproprio di pubblica utilità" in the Italian legislation.

In reference to two very hotly debated topics in recent times, libertarians, as defined in our paper, can be thought as being highly reluctant to accept or consider fair limitations for public health during pandemics, or mandatory vaccines, and also reluctant to limit their freedom for the goal of environmental action to tackle climate challenge, even though in these cases they could be convinced that inaction harms other human beings.

According to our definition utilitarians accept that individual freedom can be limited when it conflicts with collective welfare. This orientation aligns with utilitarian and pluralist traditions that prioritize societal harmony and the maximization of overall well-being. For utilitarians, the right thing to do is "the greatest good for the greatest number" (Bentham, 1789). Bentham's conception of the good is rooted in utility, understood as the balance between pleasure and pain—the "two sovereign masters" governing each individual. Thus, the utilitarian aim is to maximize aggregate utility, a hedonistic standard dependent on what people happen to experience as pleasure and pain.

Because of its focus on outcomes, utilitarianism is neither categorical nor deontological but consequentialist and teleological: the rightness of actions is determined by their ability to maximize total utility. This theoretical position is in direct opposition to libertarianism; whenever the pursuit of aggregate utility conflicts with the inviolable rights defended by libertarians, utilitarian reasoning does not recognize such rights as absolute. To clarify our example, if a given political action could maximise aggregate utility (the general interest), utilitarians should accept limits to their freedom to allow such action.

The philosophical roots of this orientation extend beyond Bentham's classical utilitarianism. Isaiah Berlin's (1958) concept of *negative liberty* captures a similar balance: individuals should be free from external interference, but restrictions are justified when actions threaten the rights or welfare of

others. In classical thought, Aristotle also emphasized the importance of balancing individual and community interests. In *Politics*, he argued that the polis exists to promote the good life for all citizens, implying that individual desires must sometimes yield to the collective good (Aristotle, 1998/350 BCE).

Consequently, utilitarians are more likely to endorse policies such as redistributive taxation, environmental regulation, or public health interventions that advance social cohesion and the general welfare, even when these measures limit personal autonomy. In our empirical framework, we classify as utilitarians those respondents who agreed that *"a society is just if individual freedom is guaranteed, provided it does not conflict with the general interest."*

Self-oriented Civics represent a third orientation, in which individual freedom is intentionally directed toward achieving the general interest as a matter of personal values or civic virtue. This position is strongly associated with republican traditions, particularly the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In *The Social Contract* (1762/2003), Rousseau contends that true freedom arises when individuals align their will with the "general will" of the community: *"The mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty"* (Rousseau, 1762/2003, Book I). Similarly, G.W.F. Hegel argued in the *Philosophy of Right* (1821/2008) that individual self-actualization is achieved through participation in the ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) of social institutions such as the family, civil society, and the state. In this view, individuals willingly integrate the collective goal into their personal autonomy. For example, civic oriented individuals may choose to recycle not because of state mandate but because it aligns with their belief in contributing to environmental sustainability.

A contemporary echo of this civic view comes from Amartya Sen, particularly in *Development as Freedom* (1999), where he reconceives liberty as capability—not merely non-interference, but the real freedom to achieve well-being and social contribution. For Sen, freedom is both a means and an end of development, where individuals actively choose to direct their capabilities toward social justice, equity, and public reasoning. He emphasizes from this point of view the concept of voluntary agency. This resonates strongly with the civic-oriented type, where individual autonomy is valued insofar as it is exercised for collective benefit, not under compulsion, but through deliberate moral engagement. Self-oriented civics therefore choose the following among the four proposed items "*a society is just if individual freedom is intentionally directed towards achieving the general interest"*

Communitarians (our fourth group) are characterised by placing the general interest above individual freedom in all cases, regardless of personal consent. This orientation draws on philosophical traditions that prioritize collective order, civic virtue, and the flourishing of the community over purely individual autonomy. Plato's *Republic* illustrates this logic, presenting an ideal society structured hierarchically to ensure harmony and justice, where individual desires are subordinated to the needs of the state (Plato, 1991).

At the same time, modern communitarian thinkers seek to reconcile individual freedom and the common good through the cultivation of civic virtues. As MacIntyre (2007) and Sandel (1998) argue, moral character must be nurtured so that autonomy and communal flourishing reinforce one another. For communitarians, the common good is not simply the aggregate of individual utilities but the

health and flourishing of communal life as a whole. Political and moral evaluation proceeds by asking how institutions and actions contribute to the integrity of the community and the development of shared traditions and practices (MacIntyre, 2007; Walzer, 1984).

Among modern thinkers, Amitai Etzioni represents a robust communitarian perspective. In *The Spirit of Community* (1993) and *Happiness is the Wrong Metric* (2018), he argues that personal autonomy must be nested within social responsibilities and that the health of communities determines not only civic cohesion but also human flourishing. Etzioni proposes a normative framework where rights and responsibilities are two sides of the same coin, emphasizing that individuals should comply with collective norms—even when they conflict with personal preference—if these norms sustain societal well-being. "The common good must guide our moral compass," he contends. In Etzioni's framework, individual liberty finds legitimacy only when embedded in shared values and community-building practices, aligning closely with our communitarian orientation.

In this framework, individuals are not seen as isolated, "unencumbered selves" (Sandel, 1984) but as embedded selves whose identities and choices derive meaning from their membership in a community. Freedom, therefore, is not understood as a set of inviolable rights held against society but as the autonomy to author one's ends in accordance with the common good. This entails the freely endorsed pursuit of communal goods and active participation in collective decisions (Sandel, 1998; Walzer, 1984).

Communitarians hold that personal flourishing and happiness arise from aligning individual freedom with the common good without contradiction. Individuals are expected to comply with (local, national or sovranational) authority needs, when necessary, even against their immediate preferences, because the health of the community sustains the conditions for genuine autonomy and well-being. In our empirical framework, we categorize as communitarians those respondents who agreed that *"a just society is one where individual freedom is oriented toward the common good."*

A key distinction between civic oriented and communitarians lies in the role of autonomy and agency. Civic oriented voluntarily align their behavior with collective goals—*"I choose to act in the general interest because I believe it is the right thing to do"*—whereas communitarians accept (or are compelled to accept) that the collective will overrides individual preferences—*"I must act in the general interest because the collective will is above my individual will, regardless of my personal beliefs."* This difference is crucial in understanding how individuals experience freedom and their relationship to the general interest.

3. Survey of Related Literature on Value Orientations and Subjective Well-Being

The relationship between ideological orientations and subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted increasing attention in political psychology and sociology, though few studies have systematically examined distinct liberty types— such as libertarians, utilitarians, civic oriented, and communitarians as in our case—as drivers of life satisfaction. In a broader context recent interdisciplinary work has nonetheless provided evidence that differences in political and moral values shape perceptions of life satisfaction and happiness.

Kobayashi (2021, 2022 and 2023) follows the closest research path to the present study. Using large-scale survey data from Japan, he develops an integrated framework combining political philosophy and positive psychology to examine how different freedom orientations influence perceptions of justice, citizenship, and subjective wellbeing. His results consistently show that communitarian and civic-oriented value systems are positively associated with collective trust, fairness perceptions, and higher self-reported well-being, particularly in the context of crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Kobayashi, 2023). In contrast, strongly libertarian orientations, which prioritize individual autonomy above collective welfare, are more weakly associated with life satisfaction and sometimes negatively related to perceptions of societal fairness.

Similarly, Kosaka (2007) examines libertarian–communitarian value conflicts using World Values Survey data and argues that communitarian cultures emphasizing social ties and collective responsibilities tend to report higher levels of happiness than highly individualistic societies. Jennings (2009), focusing on public health ethics argues that communitarian approaches—willingness to subordinate individual freedoms to societal goals—can better promote population-level well-being in contexts such as public health crises.

From a normative perspective, Etzioni (2018) advances a civic framework, criticizing utilitarian and libertarian traditions for prioritizing economic or individualistic metrics over social cohesion. Etzioni argues that happiness cannot be measured solely as individual satisfaction but is deeply embedded in community well-being. Relatedly, Frohnen (1996) documents how modern communitarian thinkers challenge the excesses of liberal individualism, warning that a persistent prioritization of individual autonomy can erode the social bonds necessary for stable and flourishing societies.

Kobayashi (2023) shows how, during the COVID-19 crisis, communitarians reported higher fairness perceptions and greater willingness to adopt protective behaviors, which correlated with higher subjective well-being. In contrast, libertarian orientations—emphasizing absolute autonomy—tended to show weaker or sometimes negative associations with collective trust and well-being outcomes.

These results suggested that value systems accepting limits on autonomy for the common good can enhance life satisfaction in contexts where collective action is essential. However, Kobayashi's typology was limited to three broad philosophical orientations and did not distinguish between *civic oriented values*—where alignment with the general interest is a voluntary choice—and *communitarian subordination*—where individual preferences are subordinated regardless of consent.

Collectively, these studies suggest that value orientations emphasizing collective welfare, social trust, and civic responsibility—characteristics of communitarian and civic oriented types—are generally associated with higher levels of subjective well-being, whereas highly individualistic (libertarian) frameworks show weaker or more inconsistent associations. These findings highlight the importance of exploring ideological orientations as determinants of life satisfaction and provide a conceptual foundation for empirical approaches that examine multiple liberty types simultaneously.

Our study differs from and expands on Kobayashi's framework in several important ways:

First, we explicitly operationalize four distinct liberty types (libertarian, utilitarian/conditional individualist, civic oriented, communitarian) based on survey responses. The distinction between

voluntary alignment (civic oriented) and enforced subordination (communitarian) is unique to our approach and conceptually important, as it captures different forms of engagement with the general interest.

Second, we are the first in this field to outline a multivariate econometric specification and after employ a recursive GSEM with instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity between liberty types and life satisfaction. Kobayashi's studies are primarily correlational and do not explicitly account for the role of concurring factors affecting wellbeing, reverse causality or unobserved heterogeneity.

Third, we perform falsification tests to validate our instruments, strengthening the causal interpretation of our findings.

Fourth, we apply the methodology of sufficient conditions showing how being libertarian is a sufficient condition to prevent very high life satisfaction, and being libertarian or utilitarian is a sufficient condition to prevent high social engagement.

Our results share some commonalities with Kobayashi's findings but also add novel insights. We also find that civic oriented and communitarian values are positively associated with life satisfaction. However, our decomposition reveals that the *voluntary* civic alignment with the general interest (civic oriented) has a distinct and significantly lower positive effect compared to communitarian subordination, which may carry costs for perceived autonomy. Libertarians, who reject general interest constraints, show weaker or even negative associations with SWB, aligning with Kobayashi's findings. We as well show that, consistently with our research hypothesis, freedom types associated with higher subjective wellbeing are also associated with higher relational intelligence, hence capacity to create more economic and social value by solving cooperatively social dilemmas.

To our knowledge, no previous study has simultaneously analyzed these four liberty types with a robust identification strategy, nor has any study used instrumental variables to disentangle causality in this context. Kobayashi's work is the closest but differs in the operationalization of liberty types, analytical approach, and geographical focus (Japan). Our study thus provides the first causal evidence of how finely differentiated liberty orientations influence subjective well-being and contributes a more nuanced theoretical framework that can be applied cross-culturally.

4. Research hypothesis

A growing body of literature suggests that value orientations shape how individuals navigate social life and, ultimately, how satisfied they are with their lives. Value systems that prioritize the common good have been shown to enhance cooperation, build social capital, and foster the trust necessary for solving social dilemmas. These orientations encourage to create and develop positive-sum interactions, where individuals work together to create shared value rather than competing for zero-sum gains. This dynamic is closely related to what can be called relational intelligence, that is the

capacity to create and sustain meaningful and productive relationships, which plays a pivotal role in resolving social dilemmas and breaking out of inefficient "homo economicus" equilibria (Becchetti, Bova and Semplici, 2025). Relational intelligence nurtures trust, reciprocity, and cooperation under conditions of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts, allowing individuals and communities to reach Pareto-superior outcomes (Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1998). Empirical evidence shows that higher relational intelligence significantly increases the probability of reporting high life satisfaction and life meaning, with some estimates indicating a 20% increase for individuals scoring above the mean in relational and emotional intelligence (Becchetti, Bova and Semplici, 2025).

Relational intelligence has a self-reinforcing dynamic: it builds quality relationships that provide social support, amplify intrinsic motivation, and make cooperative equilibria more stable over time. This aligns with the broader evidence highlighting the pivotal role of close social relationships, life purpose, and generativity (a sense of contributing to others) as determinants of life satisfaction. Individuals who view themselves as embedded in a larger social fabric tend to experience a stronger sense of meaning and report greater happiness (Kobayashi, 2021, 2023; Kosaka, 2007; Etzioni, 2018). By contrast, value orientations that place greater emphasis on individual autonomy—often seen in libertarian and, to some extent, utilitarian perspectives—may limit these relational and purpose-driven sources of well-being. While personal freedom is valued, it may also come at the cost of weaker community ties and reduced collective trust. This implies reduced capacity to create positive-sum-games and therefore social and economic value enjoying high quality of relational life.

Based on these insights, we expect that individuals who hold communitarian and civic oriented value orientations—both of which direct individual freedom toward the general interest, either through voluntary alignment or explicit prioritization of collective goals—will have high relational intelligence and therefore report higher levels of life satisfaction compared to those who adhere to utilitarian or libertarian orientations, which place greater emphasis on self-interest and individual autonomy.

H01: *Individuals who endorse communitarian and civic oriented value orientations will exhibit higher life satisfaction than those who endorse utilitarian or libertarian orientations.*

5. Descriptive and econometric findings

We test our research hypothesis on an Italian database of around 5361 individuals representative of the Italian population created with **CATI** (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing). Stratification variables are gender, age class, job status and geographical location. Variable legend is in Table 1, while descriptive statistics for our variables of interest are in Table 2.

The breakdown of the four liberty types is as follows: libertarians account for the majority of respondents (around 52 percent), self-determined civics are 19.6 percent, utilitarians around 15 percent, while communitarians around 13 percent.

Means and confidence intervals of life satisfaction and the distribution of the variable for the four freedom types are provided in Figures 1 and 2.1-2.4. Figure 1 shows that self-determined civics have higher and non overlapping average life satisfaction than libertarians and utilitarians, with

communitarian slightly below self-determined civics. Figures 2.1-2.4 show that the share of respondents with a life satisfaction level above 7 are 40% among self-determined civics, 35% among libertarians and 20 percent among utilitarians.

When looking at socio-demographic characteristics of the four groups we find that libertarians and utilitarians tend to have lower education levels than civic oriented since 41 and 60 percent of them have no more than primary education versus 35 percent of civic oriented. Moreover, the share of civic oriented with tertiary education is 19.58 percent against 14 and 5.8 percent of libertarians and utilitarians respectively.

In our research hypothesis we argue that more individualist freedom types have lower relational intelligence, intended as the capacity to solve social dilemmas in a cooperative way. We create a composite relational intelligence indicator, calculated as a simple average of answers to questions on i) listening attitude, ii) gratitude, iii) acknowledgement of the contribution of the other, iv) reciprocity and v) gift giving. We plot average relational intelligence with mean and confidence intervals for the four freedom types showing that rankings are consistent with our hypothesis with libertarian scoring lowest and communiarian highest (Figure 4).

Employing the sufficient conditions technique (Becchetti and Bova, 2025), we can find (at p-value of 0.05) four key results for libertarians and two for utilitarians. Following the conceptual framework of Becchetti and Bova (2025), we define a realization of variable X as a statistical sufficient condition for a realization of variable Y when two criteria are met within an acceptable margin of error: (i) whenever X occurs, Y is consistently observed, and (ii) if Y does not occur, it indicates that X did not happen. A helpful analogy is that of a football kick: a player's kick is a sufficient condition for the ball to move — if the ball hasn't moved, we can infer the player didn't kick it. However, several caveats apply: (1) the ball remaining still means the player didn't kick it, (2) the ball moving doesn't necessarily mean it was due to that player, and (3) the absence of the player's kick doesn't rule out other causes of motion.

By applying this methodology to our paper we find that to be libertarian is a sufficient condition to prevent high life satisfaction (9-10), high social participation, high income (>35'000€), and high engagement for sustainability (i.e. respondents do not socialize, disseminate, share ESG principles, SDFs, and circular economy knowledge). To be utilitarian is a sufficient condition to prevent high engagement for sustainability and to have low sense of community [answer range 9-10 on the question *it is important for me to feel part of a community (work, political, social, etc on a scale from 0 (not at all) and 10 (completely)*]. More in detail, among the 803 libertarians of our sample none of them has high commitment for ESG, only 0.25% high commitment for SDGs and only 0.12 percent high social participation. Among utilitarians none of them has high commitment for ESG and only 0.29% of them high commitment for SDGs.

A critical issue in our sample is that nearly half of the respondents declined to report their income. This pattern is likely indicative of a Missing Not at Random (MNAR) mechanism, as the probability of non-response appears to be related both to observed (e.g., educational attainment) and unobserved variables (i.e., income itself). We posit that individuals with lower incomes may be reluctant to disclose their earnings due to discomfort, whereas individuals with higher incomes may prefer not to report for reasons of privacy, including concerns related to taxation. It is well established that conventional approaches such as multiple imputation and full information maximum likelihood

(FIML) are unable to fully mitigate the potential bias associated with MNAR data. For this reason, we adopt a parsimonious yet informative modelling strategy by explicitly including respondents with missing income data through the introduction of a dummy variable.

To test whether our research hypothesis on the nexus between freedom-types and life satisfaction we estimate the following specification

$$
\begin{aligned}
Life\_Satisfaction_i &= \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Libertarian_i + \alpha_2 Utilitarian_i + \alpha_3 Communitarian_i + \alpha_4 Female_i \\
&+ \alpha_5 Age_i + \alpha_6 Age^2{}_i + \sum_a \beta_a D\_Income_{a,i} + \sum_b \gamma_b D\_Education_{b,i} \\
&+ \sum_c \delta_c D\_Work\_Status_{c,i} + \alpha_7 D\_Stable\_Rel_i \\
&+ \sum_d \theta_d D\_Illness_{d,i} + \sum_f \lambda_f D\_SAH_{f,i} + \sum_h \xi_h Region_{h,i} + \varepsilon_i
\end{aligned}
$$

where the dependent variable is the standard cognitive measure of subjective wellbeing on a 0-10 scale (*Overall are you satisfied about your life?*). Our main variables of interest on the right -hand side are the first three regressors testing whether the three freedom-types (libertarian, utilitarian and communitarian) have a significantly different life satisfaction than the omitted benchmark of the self-oriented civics. Controls include gender, age and age squared, income class dummies, dummies for education and work status, a measure of relationship stability, declared pathologies, self-assessed health, and regional fixed effects. Given the discrete qualitative nature of our dependent variable the model is estimated with ordered probit. Standard errors are clustered at regional level.

Empirical findings show that libertarians and utilitarians are significantly less satisfied about their life than civics and that communitarians are in the fully augmented estimate more satisfied than civics (Table 3, column 3). In terms of magnitude coefficients in the fully augmented estimate imply that libertarians and utilitarians have respectively a 11.5 and 9.75 percentage point lower probability of declaring a level of life satisfaction higher than 6, while communitarian a 7.85 percent higher probability. Results on controls confirm what is usually found in life satisfaction estimates: age has the usual U-shaped effect, higher education is positive and significant, health is positive and significant both in terms of (absence of some) declared pathologies and self-assessed health. A more stable relationship with partner has positive and significant effect.

What can be noted by comparing econometric (Table 4) and descriptive findings (Figures 1 and 2) is that in econometric findings the position of communitarians relatively improves, while that of self-determined civics gets relatively worse. More in detail, self-determined civics are no more the best as in Figures 1 and 2 since communitarians get better in the fully augmented estimate of Table 4. The rationale is that part of the descriptive advantage of the self-determined civics is determined by other control factors that contribute positively to subjective wellbeing (ie. education, health, stable relationship).

Sample splits indicate that libertarian and utilitarian effects do not hold for women and low-income respondents while those on communitarians for male, low income and secondary education respondents indicating the presence of heterogeneity in our main findings (Table 5).

As is always the case in subjective wellbeing empirical research the issue of endogeneity requires proper identification strategy. We address the problem by using the region/education level average of a given liberty type to instrument that type. We perform our estimate using a recursive generalized structural four-equation system (GSEM) where the first ordered probit equation is as in the non-IV estimated benchmark of Table 4, column 4 and in the other three equations (one for each freedom type) the instrumented liberty type is regressed on the region/education average used as instrument and the usual set of controls.

The results from the GSEM highlight that ideological orientations have significant and economically meaningful effects on life satisfaction (Table 6). Our instruments are relevant since they are strongly significant when used as regressors in the (first-stage) equations where the dependent variable is the instrumented liberty-type. In the (second-stage) equation we find that our main non IV results are confirmed since libertarian and utilitarian values are both negatively associated with life satisfaction, while communitarian values are positively associated (Table 5). These effects are therefore robust after controlling for endogeneity using strong instruments, ensuring unbiased estimates. The negative coefficients for libertarians and utilitarians suggest that a stronger emphasis on individualistic or utilitarian ideals is linked to a reduction in subjective well-being. Conversely, communitarian orientations, emphasizing collective and social cohesion, are associated with higher life satisfaction. Importantly, the magnitude of these effects is non-trivial, altering the probability of being in higher life satisfaction categories by several percentage points. This supports the idea that values and ideologies matter significantly for perceived well-being.

We compute the marginal effects (change in probability of each life satisfaction category for a 1-unit increase in each variable) from the ordered probit part of the model. Based on the coefficients and cutpoints more libertarian values increase the likelihood of being in lower satisfaction categories and decrease the likelihood of being in the highest life satisfaction category by 1.2 pp. Utilitarian values have the strongest negative impact, reducing the probability of being in the highest life satisfaction category by 2.1 pp and shifting probability mass toward the lowest categories. By contrast, a stronger communitarian orientation decreases the probability of being in the lowest life satisfaction categories and increases the likelihood of being in the top category by 1.1 pp.

Given that very few respondents report highest life satisfaction while a large mass of answers in concentrated in values between 7 and 8, we repeat our exercise by creating a simpler “very satisfied” variable taking value one when life satisfaction is higher than 6 and zero otherwise. We find that in such case that libertarian orientation reduces the probability of being very satisfied by around 12.5 percentage points, utilitarian orientation by around 11 percentage points and community orientation increases it by around 6.8 percentage points (Table 7). These magnitudes are quite close to those estimated based on non IV estimates (11.5, 9.75 and 7.85 respectively).

To test for the validity of our instrument we perform falsification tests. We regress our dependent variables (life satisfaction and very satisfied) separately on the instruments of three liberty-types plus the usual set of controls in the subsample that does not include individuals of that liberty-type. Our null hypothesis for validity is that the instruments are not significant, meaning that they operate only

through the instrumented variable and their effect on the dependent variable is nil when the pathway of the instrumented variable (presence of that liberty type) is closed. Our findings do not reject the null since instruments are never significant (Tables 8 and 9).

6. Discussion

Descriptive statistics, sufficient conditions and econometric findings provide a rich picture of the relationship between the four freedom types and life satisfaction. The fact that libertarians and utilitarians have lower civic engagement and community values when looking at sufficient conditions is consistent with our hypothesis that these can be the transmission channels for their reported lower subjective wellbeing. Their relatively lower relational intelligence is suggestive of a driving channels where individualistic freedom types are less able to solve social dilemmas and have poorer relationships and poorer social and economic outcomes from them. These findings highlight a potential vicious cycle among lower education, lower civic engagement and civic values, poor relational intelligence and lower income.

Consider as well that the relationship with income is complex. In the sample very few respondents declare income above 35,000 euros (and this occurs within each of the four freedom groups) but almost half of the sample do not declare income (presumably the share of high-income earners among non-respondents is higher as high income is one of the rationales for non-response). The share of non-respondents is equally high among all the four freedom groups.

One could believe that income and not libertarianism is the cause of low life satisfaction but this is not the case. When we put the two variables as regressors in the econometric estimate libertarianism is significant while income is not. As well when we limit our econometric analysis to the subsample of below median income individuals, libertarian and utilitarian variables are still negative and significant meaning that being civics or communitarians can lead to higher life satisfaction even with low or middle income.

The same reasoning applies to education. Correlation of freedom types with education shows that education among self-oriented civics is higher. The share of graduates among them is higher (around 20 percent) than for libertarians (14 percent) and utilitarians (6 percent). The share of those with primary school is highest among utilitarian (around 60 percent) and lowest among civics (35 percent). Here again however libertarianism and utilitarianism have negative effects on life satisfaction after controlling for education levels and they are negative and significant in the sample split estimates in the three education groups. Hence, within primary, secondary or tertiary education respondents, libertarians are significantly less satisfied with their life than civics or communitarians.

We would therefore exclude, based on all these considerations, that the low level of happiness among libertarians and utilitarians can be explained by low education and low income.

The proposition at the root of our analysis have obviously limits. We do not specify what “general interest” is and we know that it could range from something grounded in common sense or in strong and widely shared moral norms, or it can be the rhetorical veil for the arbitrariness of a dictator. Some of the answers leaning relatively more on individual freedom than general interest may therefore also be affected by lack of trust on the genuineness of this general expression

7.Conclusions

Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the relationship between value orientations and subjective well-being by examining four distinct liberty types—libertarian, utilitarian, civic oriented, and communitarian—using a nationally representative dataset and a robust identification strategy.

Our findings indicate that individuals who prioritize the general interest through voluntary alignment (civic oriented) or explicit prioritization (communitarian) report significantly higher levels of life satisfaction when compared to libertarian and utilitarian individuals, who place greater emphasis on individual autonomy. The higher reported social commitment and relational intelligence of less individualist freedom types in our research is a likely driving channel of our results and aligns with prior evidence that community-oriented values enhance social trust, relational goods, and the sense of purpose, all of which are critical determinants of subjective well-being.

While the study makes theoretical and empirical advances, several limitations warrant discussion. First, although our recursive generalized structural equation model (GSEM) with instrumental variables strengthens causal inference, potential measurement errors in the classification of liberty orientations cannot be entirely ruled out. The single-item measures used to categorize respondents may not fully capture the complexity of their value systems. Second, our dataset is cross-sectional, limiting our ability to observe changes in liberty orientations and well-being over time. Third, the analysis focuses on one national context, raising questions about external validity; the relationship between liberty orientations and well-being may vary across cultural, institutional, and socio-economic environments.

Future research could address these limitations in several ways. Longitudinal studies would allow scholars to assess whether shifts in value orientations causally influence well-being trajectories or whether happier individuals tend to adopt more collectivist values over time. Comparative cross-country analyses could test the robustness of our findings in different cultural settings and explore how institutional factors (e.g., welfare regimes, social capital levels) mediate these effects. Moreover, qualitative studies or surveys with richer psychometric instruments could deepen our understanding of how individuals conceptualize the “general interest” and how this shapes their engagement with society. Finally, future work could examine the mechanisms through which liberty orientations influence life satisfaction, such as relational intelligence, trust, and civic participation, using both experimental and observational approaches. Addressing these issues calls for inclusion and consideration of detailed and more accurate data collection in this direction in future research.

Overall, our findings suggest that liberty orientations matter for subjective well-being and that fostering value systems which align individual freedom with the general interest may have broad social benefits. Our findings are also a challenge to the opinion that happiness is the wrong metric to measure social progress: if freedom types with stronger interest for social progress are more satisfied with their life subjective wellbeing and general interest do not walk in different directions. This insight opens promising avenues for further research at the intersection of political philosophy, psychology, and economics.

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Table 1 Variable legend

Libertarian	Individual choosing the statement "a society is just if individual freedom is always guaranteed, even if this could go against the general interest"
Utilitarian	Individual choosing the statement "a society is just if individual freedom is guaranteed, provided it does not conflict with the general interest"
Civic oriented	Individual choosing the statement "a society is just if individual freedom is intentionally directed towards achieving the general interest"
Communitarian	Individual choosing the statement "a society is just if individual freedom is always subordinated to the general interest"
Life Satisfaction	Currently, how satisfied do you feel with your life overall? Please assign a value from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
Relational intelligence	Average of responses on i) listening attitude, ii) gratitude, iii) acknowledgement of the contribution of the other, iv) reciprocity and v) gift giving
Listening attitude	People confide in me easily (Completely disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither agree nor disagree=3, agree=4, completely agree = 5)
Acknowledging attitude	I compliment others when they do something well (Completely disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither agree nor disagree=3, agree=4, completely agree = 5)
Gratitude	I thank others when they do something for me (Completely disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither agree nor disagree=3, agree=4, completely agree = 5)
Reciprocity	If I receive kindness or attention, I try as much as possible to reciprocate it (Completely disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither agree nor disagree=3, agree=4, completely agree = 5)
Gift Attitude	Doing more than what others expect of me is the key to building good relationships (Completely disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither agree nor disagree=3, agree=4, completely agree = 5)
Female	(0/1) dummy for female gender
Stable relationship	How stable is the relationship with your partner ? 1: no partner; 2: not at all stable 3: quite stable 4: enough stable 5: very stable
Work status	(0/1) dummies for: unemployed, inactive, retired, houseworker, employed status
Income class	What is the total annual income level of your household from all sources, after taxes and mandatory deductions? If you do not know the exact amount, please provide an estimate (with answers classified into country income deciles)
Education	Highest level of education achieved
	Select one or more of the following illnesses for which you have received a current diagnosis.
Diagnosed diseases	(0/1) dummies if the respondent says she/has was diagnosed heath diseases, hypertension, lung diseases, cancer, artritis, asthma, Alzheimer/dementia, fibrocistis, diabetes, osteoporosis
Self-Assessed-Health	Currently, how would you describe your overall health? Please rate it on a scale from 1 (very poor), 2 (fair), 3 (good), 4 (very good), to 5 (excellent)

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std dev.	Min	Max
Libertarian	5359	0.534	0.499	0	1
Utilitarian	5359	0.150	0.357	0	1
Self-determined civic	5359	0.200	0.397	0	1
Communitarian	5359	0.130	0.336	0	1
Life Satisfaction	5359	6.756	1.321	2	10
Relational intelligence	5359	3.778	0.433	1.4	5
Female	5359	0.514	0.500	0	1
Stable relationship	5359	3.496	1.303	0	1
Unemployed	5359	0.0245	0.155	0	1
Inactive	5359	0.011	0.105	0	1
Retired	5359	0.341	0.474	0	1
Houseworker	5359	0.117	0.321	0	1
Employed	5359	0.507	0.500	0	1
Income class 1	5359	0.127	0.334	0	1
Income class 2	5359	0.116	0.320	0	1
Income class 3	5359	0.100	0.300	0	1
Income class 4	5359	0.080	0.272	0	1
Income class 5	5359	0.073	0.259	0	1
Income class 6	5359	0.029	0.169	0	1
Income class 7	5359	0.012	0.109	0	1
Income class 8	5359	0.013	0.114	0	1
Income class 9	5359	0.000	0.014	0	1
Income class 10	5359	0.000	0.014	0	1
No Answer on income	5359	0.467	0.499	0	1
Primary education	5359	0.440	0.497	0	1
Secondary education	5359	0.429	0.495	0	1
Tertiary education	5359	0.131	0.337	0	1
Italian regions					
Abruzzo	5359	.038	.190	0	1
Basilicata	5359	0.019	0.135	0	1
Calabria	5359	0.056	0.231	0	1
Campania	5359	0.075	0.263	0	1
Emilia-Romagna	5359	0.056	0.230	0	1
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	5359	0.037	0.190	0	1
Lazio	5359	0.056	0.230	0	1
Liguria	5359	0.037	0.190	0	1
Lombardia	5359	0.093	0.291	0	1
Marche	5359	0.019	0.135	0	1
Molise	5359	0.019	0.136	0	1
Piemonte	5359	0.056	0.230	0	1
Puglia	5359	0.068	0.252	0	1
Sardegna	5359	0.053	0.224	0	1
Sicilia	5359	0.075	0.263	0	1
Toscana	5359	0.074	0.263	0	1
Trentino-Alto-Adige	5359	0.037	0.190	0	1

Umbria	5359	0.019	0.135	0	1
Val d'Aosta	5359	0.019	0.135	0	1
Veneto	5359	0.093	0.291	0	1
Diagnosed diseases					
Heart diseases	5359	0.036	0.186	0	1
Hypertension	5359	0.280	0.449	0	1
Lung Diseases	5359	0.025	0.156	0	1
Cancer	5359	0.012	0.108	0	1
Artritis	5359	0.166	0.372	0	1
Asthma	5359	0.046	0.209	0	1
Alzheimer/Dementia	5359	0.004	0.064	0	1
Fibrocistis	5359	0.010	0.099	0	1
Diabetes	5359	0.124	0.330	0	1
Osteoporosis	5359	0.187	0.390	0	1
Self-Assessed-Health					
Very poor	5359	0.020	0.137	0	1
Discrete	5359	0.279	0.449	0	1
Good	5359	0.405	0.491	0	1
Very Good	5359	0.285	0.451	0	1
Excellent	5359	0.013	0.111	0	1

Figure 2 Life satisfaction and the four liberty-types



Vertical axis: life satisfaction (answer to the question: *Currently, how satisfied do you feel with your life overall? Please assign a value from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)).*

Figures 3.1-3.4 Life satisfaction distribution for the four liberty-types



Figure 3.1 Libertarian



Figure 3.2 Utilitarian



Figure 3.3 Self-oriented Civic



Figure 3.4 Communitarian

Figure 4 Relational intelligence and freedom types



1 libertarians, 2: utilitarians; 3: self-oriented civics; 4 communitarians

Table 3 Sufficient conditions and freedom-types

Description	***Condition***	***N***	***E (%)***
Libertarian and no high commitment for ESG (NHC-ESG)	Libertarian -> NHC-ESG	803	0.0%
	NHC-ESG -> - Libertarian	95	0.0%
Libertarian and no high commitment for SDGs (NHC-ESG)	Libertarian -> - NHC-SDG	803	0.25%
	NHC-SDG -> - Libertarian	138	1.45%
Libertarian and no high social participation (NH-SP)	Libertarian -> NH-SP	803	0.12%
	NH-SP -> - Libertarian	146	0.68%
Utilitarian and no high commitment for ESG(NHC-ESG)	Utilitarian -> NHC-ESG	696	0.0%
	NHC-ESG -> Utilitarian	95	0.0%
Utilitarian and no high commitment for SDGs (NHC-SDG)	Utilitarian -> NHC-SDG	696	0.29%
	NHC-SDG -> Utilitarian	138	1.45%

Legend: For any (sufficient condition) relationship between the positive realisation of the X variable and the negative realisation of the Y variable, the first line yields the share of observations rejecting the SC in the sense that the presence of the positive realisation of X is not associated with the negative realisation of Y, while the

second the share of observations yields the share of observations rejecting the SC in the sense that the the negative realisation of Y is not associated with presence of the positive realisation of X.

Non high social participation: “totally agree” answer to the question "*I am a person who participates in the political activity of my territory (e.g., relationships with politicians or public officials, participation – including through donations – in the activities of a political party or a pressure group, posting) (possible answers: totally disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, totally agree)*"

High SDG commitment: answer iv) to the question *“What is your level of information/knowledge on SDGs ? (Possible answers: i) I don’t know; ii) I have only heard about it; iii) I have studied it; iv) I used it and socialized/ shared/disseminated it)”*

High ESG commitment: answer iv) to the question *“What is your level of knowledge on ESG ? (Possible answers: i) I don’t know; ii) I have only heard about it; iii) I have studied it; iv) I used it and socialized/ shared/disseminated it)”*













Tab 4 The four freedom types and life satisfaction

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
Libertarian	-0.271**	-0.417***	-0.395***
	(0.126)	(0.119)	(0.117)
Utilitarian	-0.721***	-0.712***	-0.666***
	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Communitarian	0.0886	0.209	0.344**
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.151)
Female	0.158*	0.0539	0.00432
	(0.0840)	(0.0936)	(0.0852)
Age	-0.0791***	-0.0718***	-0.0545***
	(0.0131)	(0.0135)	(0.0137)
$[Age]^2$	0.000815***	0.000829***	0.000764***
	(0.000138)	(0.000147)	(0.000155)
Income decile 2	-0.109	-0.00603	-0.0729
	(0.147)	(0.202)	(0.192)
Income decile 3	-0.666***	-0.541***	-0.714***
	(0.0877)	(0.0848)	(0.0985)
Income decile 4	-0.575***	-0.453***	-0.637***
	(0.0863)	(0.0954)	(0.0964)
Income decile 5	-0.406***	-0.327**	-0.662***
	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.137)
Income decile 6	-0.185	-0.00600	-0.430***
	(0.170)	(0.152)	(0.160)
Income decile 7	-0.729**	-0.648**	-1.208***
	(0.305)	(0.327)	(0.348)
Income decile 8	-0.568***	-0.453**	-0.904***
	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.277)

Income decile 9	-0.0353	0.121	0.539***
	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.168)
Income decile 10	-0.195	-0.357**	-0.0208
	(0.135)	(0.152)	(0.149)
Income no answer	-0.860***	-0.763***	-0.946***
	(0.0883)	(0.0863)	(0.0808)
Secondary education	1.184***	0.971***	0.856***
	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.119)
Tertiary education	2.148***	1.943**++*	1.819***
	(0.162)	(0.160)	(0.146)
Inactive	-0.302	-0.466	-1.010*
	(0.569)	(0.604)	(0.603)
Retired	0.0249	0.390	0.248
	(0.332)	(0.326)	(0.281)
Houseworker	1.071***	1.083***	0.891***
	(0.249)	(0.276)	(0.234)
Employed	1.179***	1.110***	0.919***
	(0.260)	(0.270)	(0.243)
Stable Relationship	0.222***	0.178***	0.149***
	(0.0417)	(0.0399)	(0.0415)
Heart diseases		-0.304**	0.0663
		(0.130)	(0.133)
Hypertension		-0.735***	-0.505***
		(0.101)	(0.106)
Lung Diseases		-0.248*	-0.0150
		(0.138)	(0.162)
Cancer		-1.070***	-0.495
		(0.382)	(0.314)
Artritis		-0.0328	0.0474
		(0.107)	(0.101)
Asthma		-0.492***	-0.314**
		(0.135)	(0.145)
Alzheimer/Dementia		-0.00686	0.0973
		(0.411)	(0.327)
Fibrocistis		-0.738**	-0.591**
		(0.293)	(0.236)
Diabetes		-0.465***	-0.332***
		(0.0963)	(0.0959)
Ostheoporosis		-0.602***	-0.446***
		(0.0813)	(0.0868)
Self-Assessed-Health (fair)			-0.642***
			(0.0823)
Self-Assessed-Health (good)			-0.186
			(0.640)
Self-Assessed-Health (very good)			1.292***
			(0.0880)
Self-Assessed-Health (excellent)			-1.689***
			(0.226)
Basilicata	0.504***	0.501***	0.503***
	(0.0323)	(0.0342)	(0.0347)
Calabria	-0.183***	-0.178***	-0.227***

	(0.0109)	(0.0162)	(0.0173)
Campania	-0.207***	-0.133***	-0.0451**
	(0.0186)	(0.0194)	(0.0220)
Emilia-Romagna	0.0867***	0.104***	0.153***
	(0.0321)	(0.0332)	(0.0338)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	-0.193***	-0.169***	-0.170***
	(0.0192)	(0.0213)	(0.0204)
Lazio	0.101***	0.0760***	0.0886***
	(0.0125)	(0.0136)	(0.0152)
Liguria	0.268***	0.313***	0.339***
	(0.0250)	(0.0274)	(0.0294)
Lombardia	0.157***	0.182***	0.223***
	(0.0156)	(0.0178)	(0.0197)
Marche	0.188***	0.227***	0.185***
	(0.0197)	(0.0181)	(0.0197)
Molise	0.262***	0.194***	0.184***
	(0.0538)	(0.0536)	(0.0503)
Piemonte	0.172***	0.183***	0.204***
	(0.0218)	(0.0224)	(0.0225)
Puglia	0.193***	0.146***	0.0304*
	(0.0122)	(0.0142)	(0.0162)
Sardegna	0.105***	0.0944***	0.0313
	(0.0165)	(0.0213)	(0.0209)
Sicilia	0.331***	0.332***	0.296***
	(0.0202)	(0.0203)	(0.0190)
Toscana	0.112***	0.120***	0.0977***
	(0.0134)	(0.0172)	(0.0180)
Trentino-Alto-Adige	0.00304	0.0165	-0.0431**
	(0.0126)	(0.0140)	(0.0219)
Umbria	0.439***	0.281***	0.244***
	(0.0152)	(0.0184)	(0.0216)
Valle d'Aosta	0.182***	0.163***	0.111***
	(0.0190)	(0.0184)	(0.0190)
Veneto	0.0999***	0.101***	0.0985***
	(0.00711)	(0.0108)	(0.0122)
/cut1	-7.383***	-7.819***	-7.484***
	(0.582)	(0.593)	(0.527)
/cut2	-5.150***	-5.580***	-5.239***
	(0.544)	(0.583)	(0.523)
/cut3	-3.352***	-3.755***	-3.390***
	(0.463)	(0.488)	(0.431)
/cut4	-1.809***	-2.132***	-1.729***
	(0.460)	(0.451)	(0.394)
/cut5	-0.508	-0.736*	-0.276
	(0.454)	(0.439)	(0.382)
/cut6	0.946**	0.775*	1.338***
	(0.473)	(0.450)	(0.383)
/cut7	3.552***	3.398***	4.107***
	(0.445)	(0.426)	(0.388)
/cut8	5.515***	5.366***	6.106***
	(0.535)	(0.509)	(0.478)

Log likelihood	-8019.125	-7843.426	-7610.728
Observations	5,359	5,359	5,359

Omitted benchmark: self-regulated civic liberty type; male, primary education, first income decile, unemployed, very poor self-assessed-health living in Abruzzi region. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5. The four freedom types and life satisfaction (gender, income and education splits)

VARIABLES	(1) Male	(2) Female	(3) Income below median	(4) Income above median	(5) Primary education	(6) Secondary education	(7) Tertiary education
Libertarian	-0.594***	-0.179*	-0.442**	-0.166*	-0.430***	-0.473***	-0.507***
	(0.191)	(0.104)	(0.188)	(0.0996)	(0.126)	(0.165)	(0.139)
Utilitarian	-0.932***	-0.145	-0.866***	-0.288*	-0.998***	-0.203	0.0987
	(0.141)	(0.128)	(0.187)	(0.147)	(0.171)	(0.145)	(0.417)
Communitarian	0.181	0.407***	0.477	0.729***	0.479***	0.0156	-1.408***
	(0.236)	(0.137)	(0.326)	(0.170)	(0.183)	(0.220)	(0.464)
Female			0.119	5.43e-05	0.0825	0.175	-0.855***
			(0.207)	(0.0917)	(0.0834)	(0.108)	(0.243)
Age	-0.0691***	-0.0413**	-0.0954	-0.102***	-0.114***	-0.0110	0.0630
	(0.0218)	(0.0208)	(0.0711)	(0.0276)	(0.0358)	(0.0258)	(0.0730)
$[Age]^2$	0.000851***	0.000720***	0.00120	0.00124***	0.00128***	0.000232	-0.000299
	(0.000217)	(0.000242)	(0.000799)	(0.000264)	(0.000312)	(0.000310)	(0.000957)
Income decile 2	-0.165	0.00941		-0.105	0.108	-0.879**	1.108
	(0.223)	(0.243)		(0.194)	(0.220)	(0.351)	(0.942)
Income decile 3	-1.107***	-0.323**		-0.851***	-0.840***	-1.069***	0.891
	(0.145)	(0.129)		(0.0936)	(0.169)	(0.253)	(1.324)
Income decile 4	-0.836***	-0.391**		-0.654***	-0.373**	-1.140***	-1.003
	(0.162)	(0.177)		(0.122)	(0.171)	(0.238)	(0.879)
Income decile 5	-1.034***	-0.144	-1.835***	-0.560***	-0.498**	-0.801***	-1.850*
	(0.200)	(0.132)	(0.295)	(0.165)	(0.253)	(0.226)	(1.087)
Income decile 6	-0.676***	0.139	-1.223***		-1.551***	-0.625**	-0.454
	(0.211)	(0.249)	(0.326)		(0.156)	(0.286)	(0.967)
Income decile 7	-0.584	-0.857***	-1.857***			0.00163	-1.360
	(0.411)	(0.251)	(0.489)			(0.602)	(1.104)
Income decile 8	-1.223	-0.208	-1.771***			-0.485	-0.891
	(0.758)	(0.266)	(0.395)			(0.661)	(1.045)
Income decile 9		1.344***	0.654*				0.780
		(0.200)	(0.372)				(0.943)
Income decile 10	-0.936***						-0.797

	(0.236)						(1.098)
Income no answer	-1.391***	-0.332***			-0.943***	-1.233***	-0.200
	(0.111)	(0.118)			(0.112)	(0.214)	(0.924)
Secondary education	0.652***	1.093***	0.960**	1.152***			
	(0.164)	(0.162)	(0.374)	(0.159)			
Tertiary education	1.919***	1.695***	1.464***	1.981***			
	(0.203)	(0.254)	(0.383)	(0.263)			
Inactive	-0.892	-1.110*		1.952***	-1.304*	-0.647	-9.013***
	(0.981)	(0.659)		(0.735)	(0.678)	(0.815)	(1.076)
Retired	1.228	0.341	3.236	-0.106	1.511*	0.445	-2.777**
	(0.827)	(0.339)	(3.392)	(0.649)	(0.845)	(0.391)	(1.240)
Houseworker	2.032**		3.925	0.733	2.272***	0.757*	-4.741***
	(0.876)		(3.489)	(0.526)	(0.751)	(0.454)	(1.359)
Employed	2.056**	0.786***	3.649	0.590	2.368***	0.642*	-4.202***
	(0.899)	(0.247)	(3.516)	(0.590)	(0.793)	(0.374)	(0.554)
Stable relationship	0.125***	0.217***	0.363***	0.199***	0.143*	0.169***	0.249***
	(0.0463)	(0.0562)	(0.102)	(0.0480)	(0.0744)	(0.0483)	(0.0722)
Heart diseases	0.538***	-0.531***	-1.501**	-0.209	0.238	-0.883***	-3.829***
	(0.185)	(0.168)	(0.669)	(0.178)	(0.151)	(0.268)	(0.428)
Hypertension	-0.725***	-0.271**	0.215	-0.497***	-0.558***	-0.249*	0.574
	(0.150)	(0.136)	(0.299)	(0.130)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.490)
Lung Diseases	0.150	-0.303*	-2.777	-0.0971	0.0827	-0.989***	0.303
	(0.279)	(0.181)	(4.668)	(0.139)	(0.194)	(0.365)	(1.491)
Cancer	-0.384	-1.348*		-0.275	-0.622*	0.246	
	(0.265)	(0.739)		(0.390)	(0.375)	(0.505)	
Artritis	0.239*	-0.419***	-1.541***	-0.148	0.224**	-0.717***	4.549***
	(0.132)	(0.159)	(0.557)	(0.171)	(0.102)	(0.277)	(1.406)
Asthma	-0.405**	-0.171	-0.537	-0.437**	-0.118	-0.737***	-1.965***
	(0.178)	(0.225)	(0.747)	(0.180)	(0.204)	(0.268)	(0.478)
Alzheimer/Dementia	0.334	-0.163		0.185	0.0741	5.089**	
	(0.485)	(0.383)		(0.382)	(0.338)	(2.500)	
Fibrocistis	-0.847***	0.957		-1.051***	-0.601**	-1.763	
	(0.260)	(0.776)		(0.346)	(0.246)	(2.040)	
Diabetes	-0.103	-0.679***	0.312	-0.475***	-0.349***	-0.170	1.235**

	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.430)	(0.134)	(0.105)	(0.273)	(0.504)
Ostheoporosis	-0.448***	0.0678	-0.735	0.0739	-0.437***	0.0233	-1.454
	(0.135)	(0.151)	(0.552)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.236)	(1.583)
Self-Assessed-Health (fair)	-0.581***	-0.621***	0.336*	-0.718***	-0.768***	-0.00606	-0.243
	(0.136)	(0.144)	(0.204)	(0.118)	(0.105)	(0.241)	(0.605)
Self-Assessed-Health (good)	-1.181	0.564	1.875***	2.447***	-5.580***	-0.203	0.702
	(1.265)	(0.580)	(0.335)	(0.618)	(0.541)	(0.583)	(0.760)
Self-Assessed-Health (very good)	1.317***	1.273***	1.846***	1.149***	1.793***	1.310***	1.185***
	(0.114)	(0.137)	(0.238)	(0.114)	(0.235)	(0.116)	(0.160)
Self-Assessed-Health (excellent)	-2.172***	-1.025**		-2.335***	-1.886***	-2.991***	
	(0.304)	(0.464)		(0.343)	(0.325)	(0.946)	
Basilicata	0.749***	0.191***	-1.029***	0.890***	0.706***	0.659***	-1.770***
	(0.0565)	(0.0461)	(0.202)	(0.0551)	(0.0640)	(0.101)	(0.224)
Calabria	-0.268***	-0.216***	-0.0925	-0.267***	-0.266***	-0.00174	-1.691***
	(0.0331)	(0.0188)	(0.116)	(0.0338)	(0.0166)	(0.0540)	(0.203)
Campania	-0.0651*	-0.0248	0.654***	-0.0346	-0.122**	0.189***	-0.869***
	(0.0336)	(0.0335)	(0.159)	(0.0409)	(0.0601)	(0.0714)	(0.197)
Emilia-Romagna	0.224***	0.0708	-0.0303	0.151**	0.295***	0.0956***	0.319***
	(0.0394)	(0.0480)	(0.105)	(0.0629)	(0.0558)	(0.0311)	(0.120)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	-0.150***	-0.225***	-0.418***	-0.130***	-0.229***	0.107*	-1.194***
	(0.0339)	(0.0403)	(0.130)	(0.0363)	(0.0472)	(0.0606)	(0.0968)
Lazio	0.224***	-0.0734**	-0.204***	0.399***	0.280***	0.369***	-1.532***
	(0.0319)	(0.0315)	(0.0671)	(0.0308)	(0.0265)	(0.0277)	(0.125)
Liguria	0.365***	0.126***	-0.654***	0.395***	0.423***	0.543***	-1.085***
	(0.0305)	(0.0420)	(0.100)	(0.0500)	(0.0531)	(0.0430)	(0.236)
Lombardia	0.236***	0.224***	0.00282	0.311***	0.219***	0.483***	-1.145***
	(0.0379)	(0.0334)	(0.0943)	(0.0408)	(0.0460)	(0.0498)	(0.135)
Marche	0.0183	0.449***	0.0798	0.728***	0.266***	0.568***	-3.121***
	(0.0625)	(0.0326)	(0.170)	(0.0475)	(0.0471)	(0.0545)	(0.201)
Molise	0.285***	0.135	0.248**	0.0271	0.163*	0.650***	-0.543***
	(0.0694)	(0.0945)	(0.123)	(0.0650)	(0.0962)	(0.109)	(0.167)
Piemonte	0.0854**	0.367***	0.112	0.404***	0.295***	0.475***	-1.359***
	(0.0411)	(0.0314)	(0.0748)	(0.0371)	(0.0477)	(0.0438)	(0.185)
Puglia	0.302***	-0.381***	-0.470***	0.203***	0.116***	0.269***	-1.366***

	(0.0364)	(0.0242)	(0.132)	(0.0420)	(0.0299)	(0.0562)	(0.125)
Sardegna	0.0255	0.0256	0.195	0.126**	0.137***	0.107	-0.981***
	(0.0453)	(0.0394)	(0.149)	(0.0518)	(0.0404)	(0.0792)	(0.193)
Sicilia	0.250***	0.347***	0.397**	0.398***	0.430***	0.385***	-1.023***
	(0.0470)	(0.0356)	(0.185)	(0.0306)	(0.0521)	(0.0665)	(0.0994)
Toscana	0.305***	-0.149***	-0.0503	0.201***	0.336***	0.114***	-1.132***
	(0.0418)	(0.0188)	(0.0977)	(0.0361)	(0.0439)	(0.0412)	(0.104)
Trentino-Alto-Adige	-0.00205	-0.343***	-0.194**	-0.130***	-0.0603	0.0951**	-1.314***
	(0.0309)	(0.0402)	(0.0888)	(0.0283)	(0.0392)	(0.0438)	(0.145)
Umbria	0.447***	-0.0836**	0.575***	-0.0633	-0.228***	0.851***	-0.713***
	(0.0289)	(0.0392)	(0.102)	(0.0498)	(0.0484)	(0.0488)	(0.1000)
Valle d'Aosta	0.393***	-0.383***	0.603***	0.420***	0.334***	0.0613	-0.989***
	(0.0355)	(0.0592)	(0.106)	(0.0512)	(0.0565)	(0.0679)	(0.131)
Veneto	0.109***	-0.0211	-0.185***	0.226***	0.158***	0.282***	-1.121***
	(0.0390)	(0.0258)	(0.0695)	(0.0319)	(0.0251)	(0.0355)	(0.0946)
/cut1	-7.456***	-6.924***	-3.925	-8.419***	-8.477***	-6.348***	-11.79***
	(1.111)	(1.203)	(4.082)	(1.046)	(1.081)	(1.012)	(2.524)
/cut2	-5.530***	-3.808***	-2.639	-6.191***	-6.205***	-4.112***	-9.590***
	(1.048)	(0.627)	(4.016)	(0.984)	(1.199)	(0.696)	(2.275)
/cut3	-3.481***	-2.276***	1.357	-4.681***	-3.878***	-2.993***	-8.212***
	(1.031)	(0.623)	(4.062)	(0.998)	(1.156)	(0.707)	(2.292)
/cut4	-1.694	-0.668	3.423	-2.896***	-1.853	-2.056***	-6.565***
	(1.031)	(0.541)	(4.048)	(0.866)	(1.179)	(0.683)	(2.200)
/cut5	-0.208	0.878*	6.616*	-1.041	-0.309	-0.530	-5.048**
	(1.049)	(0.509)	(4.014)	(0.871)	(1.174)	(0.675)	(2.169)
/cut6	1.252	2.713***	10.14**	0.789	1.136	1.376**	-1.810
	(1.036)	(0.519)	(4.180)	(0.857)	(1.185)	(0.663)	(2.094)
/cut7	3.975***	5.629***		3.592***	3.500***	4.373***	1.347
	(1.009)	(0.537)		(0.888)	(1.269)	(0.697)	(2.136)
/cut8	5.850***	7.882***		4.808***	4.701***	6.455***	
	(0.980)	(0.600)		(0.947)	(1.283)	(0.688)	
Log likelihood	-3971.927	-3502.826	-721.277	-3448.772	-3459.382	-3044.111	-803.219
Observations	2,756	2,603	683	2,560	2,361	2,298	700

Omitted benchmark: self-regulated civic liberty type; male (excluding gender split), primary education (escluding education split), first income decile (escluding income split), student, very poor self-assessed-health living in Abruzzo region. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6 Generalized structural four-equation system (GSEM)- Life satisfaction

VARIABLES	(1) Dep. Var. Libertarian	(2) Dep. Var. Utilitarian	(3) Dep. Var. Communitarian	(4) Dep. Var. Life Satisfaction	(5)
Region/edication libertarian mean	0.963***				
	(0.126)				
Region/edication utilitarian mean		0.966***			
		(0.143)			
Region/edication communitarian mean			0.918***		
			(0.116)		
libertarian				-0.194***	
				(0.0392)	
utilitarian				-0.364***	
				(0.0518)	
communitarian				0.182***	
				(0.0530)	
Age	-0.00455	-0.00159	-0.00492**	-0.0305***	
	(0.00308)	(0.00218)	(0.00208)	(0.00681)	
$[Age]^2$	7.64e-05**	1.54e-06	4.89e-05**	0.000444***	
	(3.28e-05)	(2.33e-05)	(2.22e-05)	(7.26e-05)	
Female	-0.0750***	-0.00629	0.0391***	0.00812	
	(0.0152)	(0.0108)	(0.0103)	(0.0339)	
Income decile 2	-0.113***	0.0510**	0.0506***	-0.0475	
	(0.0283)	(0.0201)	(0.0192)	(0.0624)	
Income decile 3	-0.0189	0.0643***	-0.0433**	-0.435***	
	(0.0305)	(0.0217)	(0.0207)	(0.0674)	
Income decile 4	-0.171***	0.0842***	0.0459**	-0.381***	
	(0.0326)	(0.0232)	(0.0221)	(0.0724)	

Income decile 5	-0.0965***	0.0138	0.0744***	-0.393***
	(0.0348)	(0.0247)	(0.0236)	(0.0774)
Income decile 6	-0.0308	0.00891	0.00669	-0.257**
	(0.0469)	(0.0334)	(0.0318)	(0.105)
Income decile 7	-0.0572	-0.00788	0.0351	-0.645***
	(0.0669)	(0.0475)	(0.0454)	(0.149)
Income decile 8	0.169**	0.0236	-0.0436	-0.508***
	(0.0658)	(0.0467)	(0.0446)	(0.149)
Income decile 9	0.322	0.0155	-0.0323	0.293
	(0.476)	(0.338)	(0.322)	(1.105)
Income decile 10	-0.785*	0.00138	0.00355	0.0139
	(0.476)	(0.338)	(0.323)	(1.106)
Income no answer	-0.147***	0.0915***	-0.00889	-0.573***
	(0.0241)	(0.0171)	(0.0163)	(0.0536)
Secondary education	-0.0408*	0.0274	0.0711***	0.451***
	(0.0229)	(0.0203)	(0.0149)	(0.0482)
Tertiary education	-0.0571*	0.0292	0.0857***	0.941***
	(0.0307)	(0.0290)	(0.0215)	(0.0664)
Inactive	-0.205***	0.0899*	0.0751	-0.377**
	(0.0749)	(0.0532)	(0.0508)	(0.165)
Retired	-0.0125	0.0827**	-0.0866**	0.167
	(0.0547)	(0.0388)	(0.0371)	(0.121)
Houseworker	-0.0930*	0.0183	0.0514	0.536***
	(0.0506)	(0.0360)	(0.0344)	(0.112)
Employed	-0.0804*	0.0881***	-0.0515*	0.587***
	(0.0449)	(0.0319)	(0.0305)	(0.0998)
Stable relationship	0.00957	0.0169***	-0.0192***	0.0825***
	(0.00645)	(0.00458)	(0.00437)	(0.0144)
Heart diseases	0.00506	-0.132***	-0.00196	0.0383
	(0.0385)	(0.0274)	(0.0261)	(0.0845)
Hypertension	-0.0787***	-0.0197	0.0732***	-0.294***
	(0.0205)	(0.0145)	(0.0139)	(0.0451)
Lung Diseases	0.00123	-0.0624*	0.0327	-0.0201
	(0.0457)	(0.0325)	(0.0310)	(0.100)

Cancer	-0.0625	-0.00410	-0.0937**	-0.296**
	(0.0658)	(0.0467)	(0.0446)	(0.144)
Artritis	-0.164***	-0.0172	0.0579***	0.0436
	(0.0219)	(0.0156)	(0.0149)	(0.0484)
Asthma	-0.0897***	0.0623***	0.0244	-0.183**
	(0.0330)	(0.0234)	(0.0224)	(0.0722)
Alzheimer/Dementia	0.0798	-0.0611	-0.134*	0.0776
	(0.102)	(0.0727)	(0.0694)	(0.223)
Fibrocistis	0.0866	-0.112**	-0.0774*	-0.341**
	(0.0682)	(0.0485)	(0.0462)	(0.149)
Diabetes	-0.0677***	0.0199	0.0331**	-0.199***
	(0.0231)	(0.0164)	(0.0156)	(0.0506)
Ostheoporosis	-0.149***	0.176***	0.0269*	-0.241***
	(0.0232)	(0.0165)	(0.0158)	(0.0517)
Self-Assessed-Health (fair)	-0.0963***	0.0398**	0.0678***	-0.376***
	(0.0220)	(0.0156)	(0.0149)	(0.0485)
Self-Assessed-Health (good)	-0.232***	-0.0239	0.209***	-0.153
	(0.0608)	(0.0432)	(0.0412)	(0.135)
Self-Assessed-Health (very good)	-0.0122	-0.0229*	-0.0130	0.729***
	(0.0172)	(0.0122)	(0.0117)	(0.0395)
Self-Assessed-Health (excellent)	-0.0317	-0.0950**	0.0992**	-0.986***
	(0.0596)	(0.0423)	(0.0403)	(0.131)
Basilicata	-0.0113	0.0115	-0.00687	0.358***
	(0.0588)	(0.0423)	(0.0397)	(0.130)
Calabria	0.0143	-0.0119	0.000836	-0.117
	(0.0433)	(0.0310)	(0.0294)	(0.0957)
Campania	0.0406	-0.00140	-0.0251	-0.0639
	(0.0412)	(0.0322)	(0.0285)	(0.0913)
Emilia-Romagna	0.0180	-0.0189	-0.00410	0.0969
	(0.0444)	(0.0415)	(0.0303)	(0.0964)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	0.0192	0.00441	-0.0148	-0.113
	(0.0484)	(0.0340)	(0.0324)	(0.105)
Lazio	-0.00242	0.00413	-0.00277	0.0335
	(0.0433)	(0.0312)	(0.0294)	(0.0958)

Liguria	0.00746	-0.0160	-0.00403	0.208**	
	(0.0479)	(0.0359)	(0.0332)	(0.105)	
Lombardia	0.00878	-0.00537	-0.00583	0.131	
	(0.0401)	(0.0296)	(0.0272)	(0.0881)	
Marche	0.0137	0.00115	-0.00805	0.0399	
	(0.0584)	(0.0417)	(0.0397)	(0.129)	
Molise	0.00783	0.0271	-0.0283	0.146	
	(0.0589)	(0.0423)	(0.0399)	(0.130)	
Piemonte	0.00863	-0.00580	-0.00977	0.116	
	(0.0443)	(0.0333)	(0.0296)	(0.0960)	
Puglia	0.00112	-0.0131	0.00600	-0.00478	
	(0.0418)	(0.0302)	(0.0283)	(0.0925)	
Sardegna	0.0209	-0.0106	-0.00795	0.0191	
	(0.0440)	(0.0312)	(0.0299)	(0.0972)	
Sicilia	0.0183	-0.00627	-0.00571	0.139	
	(0.0412)	(0.0299)	(0.0279)	(0.0913)	
Toscana	-0.000607	-0.00516	0.00289	0.0284	
	(0.0412)	(0.0296)	(0.0279)	(0.0912)	
Trentino-Alto-Adige	0.00900	-0.0135	-0.00217	-0.0165	
	(0.0476)	(0.0338)	(0.0324)	(0.105)	
Umbria	-0.0287	-0.00172	0.0222	0.160	
	(0.0589)	(0.0414)	(0.0395)	(0.129)	
Valle d'Aosta	0.00261	-0.0138	-0.00113	0.0774	
	(0.0585)	(0.0414)	(0.0398)	(0.129)	
Veneto	0.00324	-0.00624	-0.00357	0.0423	
	(0.0397)	(0.0283)	(0.0269)	(0.0880)	
var(e.libertarian)					0.225***
					(0.00435)
var(e.utilitarian)					0.113***
					(0.00219)
var(e.communit)					0.103***
					(0.0+0199)
Constant	0.326***	-0.146**	0.113*		

	(0.106)	(0.0669)	(0.0626)		
Log likelihood					-14564.968
Observations	5,359	5,359	5,359	5,359	5,359

Recursive generalized structural four-equation system (GSEM) where the first ordered probit equation is as in the non IV estimated benchmark of Table 3, column 4 and in the other three equations (one for each freedom type) the instrumented liberty type is regressed on the usual set of controls and the region/education average instrument. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7 Generalized structural four-equation system (GSEM)- Probability of high life satisfaction (life satisfaction above 6)

	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
VARIABLES	Libertarian	Utilitarian	Communitarian	Very satisfied	/
Mean regional/education libertarian	0.963***				
	(0.126)				
Mean regional/education utilitarian		0.966***			
		(0.143)			
Mean regional/education communitarian			0.918***		
			(0.116)		
libertarian				-0.447***	
				(0.0596)	
utilitarian				-0.398***	
				(0.0759)	
communitarian				0.242***	
				(0.0761)	
Age	-0.00455	-0.00159	-0.00492**	-0.0448***	
	(0.00308)	(0.00218)	(0.00208)	(0.00970)	
$[Age]^2$	7.64e-05**	1.54e-06	4.89e-05**	0.000632***	
	(3.28e-05)	(2.33e-05)	(2.22e-05)	(0.000103)	
Fermale	-0.0750***	-0.00629	0.0391***	0.159***	

	(0.0152)	(0.0108)	(0.0103)	(0.0484)
Income decile 2	-0.113***	0.0510**	0.0506***	-0.258***
	(0.0283)	(0.0201)	(0.0192)	(0.0850)
Income decile 3	-0.0189	0.0643***	-0.0433**	-0.533***
	(0.0305)	(0.0217)	(0.0207)	(0.0956)
Income decile 4	-0.171***	0.0842***	0.0459**	-0.595***
	(0.0326)	(0.0232)	(0.0221)	(0.103)
Income decile 5	-0.0965***	0.0138	0.0744***	-0.720***
	(0.0348)	(0.0247)	(0.0236)	(0.114)
Income decile 6	-0.0308	0.00891	0.00669	-0.413**
	(0.0469)	(0.0334)	(0.0318)	(0.177)
Income decile 7	-0.0572	-0.00788	0.0351	4.751
	(0.0669)	(0.0475)	(0.0454)	(149.2)
Income decile 8	0.169**	0.0236	-0.0436	4.170
	(0.0658)	(0.0467)	(0.0446)	(142.3)
Income decile 9	0.322	0.0155	-0.0323	4.002
	(0.476)	(0.338)	(0.322)	(1,280)
Income decile 10	-0.785*	0.00138	0.00355	3.607
	(0.476)	(0.338)	(0.323)	(1,280)
Income no answer	-0.147***	0.0915***	-0.00889	-0.778***
	(0.0241)	(0.0171)	(0.0163)	(0.0747)
Secondary education	-0.0408*	0.0274	0.0711***	0.610***
	(0.0229)	(0.0203)	(0.0149)	(0.0654)
Tertiary education	-0.0571*	0.0292	0.0857***	0.860***
	(0.0307)	(0.0290)	(0.0215)	(0.0973)
Inactive	-0.205***	0.0899*	0.0751	-0.844***
	(0.0749)	(0.0532)	(0.0508)	(0.219)
Retired	-0.0125	0.0827**	-0.0866**	-0.298*
	(0.0547)	(0.0388)	(0.0371)	(0.166)
Houseworker	-0.0930*	0.0183	0.0514	0.459***
	(0.0506)	(0.0360)	(0.0344)	(0.153)
Employed	-0.0804*	0.0881***	-0.0515*	0.464***
	(0.0449)	(0.0319)	(0.0305)	(0.134)
Stable relationship	0.00957	0.0169***	-0.0192***	0.178***

	(0.00645)	(0.00458)	(0.00437)	(0.0205)
Heart diseases	0.00506	-0.132***	-0.00196	-0.307**
	(0.0385)	(0.0274)	(0.0261)	(0.120)
Hypertension	-0.0787***	-0.0197	0.0732***	-0.499***
	(0.0205)	(0.0145)	(0.0139)	(0.0597)
Lung Diseases	0.00123	-0.0624*	0.0327	-0.0518
	(0.0457)	(0.0325)	(0.0310)	(0.137)
Cancer	-0.0625	-0.00410	-0.0937**	-0.00628
	(0.0658)	(0.0467)	(0.0446)	(0.203)
Artritis	-0.164***	-0.0172	0.0579***	0.0271
	(0.0219)	(0.0156)	(0.0149)	(0.0664)
Asthma	-0.0897***	0.0623***	0.0244	-0.182*
	(0.0330)	(0.0234)	(0.0224)	(0.101)
Alzheimer/Dementia	0.0798	-0.0611	-0.134*	0.0108
	(0.102)	(0.0727)	(0.0694)	(0.305)
Fibrocistis	0.0866	-0.112**	-0.0774*	-0.668***
	(0.0682)	(0.0485)	(0.0462)	(0.227)
Diabetes	-0.0677***	0.0199	0.0331**	-0.267***
	(0.0231)	(0.0164)	(0.0156)	(0.0700)
Ostheoporosis	-0.149***	0.176***	0.0269*	-0.191***
	(0.0232)	(0.0165)	(0.0158)	(0.0698)
Self-Assessed-Health (fair)	-0.0963***	0.0398**	0.0678***	-0.408***
	(0.0220)	(0.0156)	(0.0149)	(0.0639)
Self-Assessed-Health (good)	-0.232***	-0.0239	0.209***	-0.486***
	(0.0608)	(0.0432)	(0.0412)	(0.183)
Self-Assessed-Health (very good)	-0.0122	-0.0229*	-0.0130	0.970***
	(0.0172)	(0.0122)	(0.0117)	(0.0630)
Self-Assessed-Health (excellent)	-0.0317	-0.0950**	0.0992**	-0.769***
	(0.0596)	(0.0423)	(0.0403)	(0.196)
Basilicata	-0.0113	0.0115	-0.00687	0.286
	(0.0588)	(0.0423)	(0.0397)	(0.184)
Calabria	0.0143	-0.0119	0.000836	-0.143
	(0.0433)	(0.0310)	(0.0294)	(0.135)
Campania	0.0406	-0.00140	-0.0251	0.00486

	(0.0412)	(0.0322)	(0.0285)	(0.128)
Emilia-Romagna	0.0180	-0.0189	-0.00410	0.306**
	(0.0444)	(0.0415)	(0.0303)	(0.140)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	0.0192	0.00441	-0.0148	-0.128
	(0.0484)	(0.0340)	(0.0324)	(0.149)
Lazio	-0.00242	0.00413	-0.00277	0.200
	(0.0433)	(0.0312)	(0.0294)	(0.138)
Liguria	0.00746	-0.0160	-0.00403	0.439***
	(0.0479)	(0.0359)	(0.0332)	(0.156)
Lombardia	0.00878	-0.00537	-0.00583	0.192
	(0.0401)	(0.0296)	(0.0272)	(0.126)
Marche	0.0137	0.00115	-0.00805	0.0477
	(0.0584)	(0.0417)	(0.0397)	(0.178)
Molise	0.00783	0.0271	-0.0283	0.142
	(0.0589)	(0.0423)	(0.0399)	(0.181)
Piemonte	0.00863	-0.00580	-0.00977	0.323**
	(0.0443)	(0.0333)	(0.0296)	(0.138)
Puglia	0.00112	-0.0131	0.00600	0.0640
	(0.0418)	(0.0302)	(0.0283)	(0.133)
Sardegna	0.0209	-0.0106	-0.00795	0.120
	(0.0440)	(0.0312)	(0.0299)	(0.138)
Sicilia	0.0183	-0.00627	-0.00571	0.138
	(0.0412)	(0.0299)	(0.0279)	(0.129)
Toscana	-0.000607	-0.00516	0.00289	0.0149
	(0.0412)	(0.0296)	(0.0279)	(0.131)
Trentino-Alto-Adige	0.00900	-0.0135	-0.00217	-0.0183
	(0.0476)	(0.0338)	(0.0324)	(0.153)
Umbria	-0.0287	-0.00172	0.0222	0.252
	(0.0589)	(0.0414)	(0.0395)	(0.188)
Valle d'Aosta	0.00261	-0.0138	-0.00113	0.0875
	(0.0585)	(0.0414)	(0.0398)	(0.188)
Veneto	0.00324	-0.00624	-0.00357	0.0489
	(0.0397)	(0.0283)	(0.0269)	(0.126)
var(e.libertarian)				0.225***

					(0.00435)
var(e.utilitarian)					0.113***
					(0.00219)
var(e.communit)					0.103***
					(0.00199)
Constant	0.326***	-0.146**	0.113*	0.392	
	(0.106)	(0.0669)	(0.0626)	(0.279)	
Log likelihood					-9316.9532
Observations	5,359	5,359	5,359	5,359	5,359

Very satisfied: (0/1) dummy taking value one when life satisfaction higher than 6. Mean regional/education libertarian: average regional/education level sahre of libertarians. Mean regional/education utilitarian: average regional/education level sahre of utilitarians; Mean regional/education communitarian: average regional/education level share of communitarians. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8 Falsification test (life satisfaction dependent variable)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES			
Mean regional/education libertarian	-0.429		
	(0.650)		
Mean regional/education utilitarian		0.552	
		(0.926)	
Mean regional/education communitarian			-0.00677
			(0.706)
libertarian		-0.409***	-0.384***
		(0.117)	(0.116)
utilitarian	-0.738***		-0.608***
	(0.130)		(0.112)
communitarian	0.304**	0.311**	

	(0.152)	(0.147)	
Age	-0.0339*	-0.0478***	-0.0617***
	(0.0190)	(0.0163)	(0.0147)
$[Age]^2$	0.000471**	0.000754***	0.000852***
	(0.000199)	(0.000180)	(0.000171)
Fermale	0.0571	-0.0786	-0.0408
	(0.143)	(0.0814)	(0.0836)
Income decile 2	0.797***	-0.0121	-0.553***
	(0.292)	(0.193)	(0.183)
Income decile 3	-0.0783	-0.605***	-0.973***
	(0.124)	(0.0940)	(0.127)
Income decile 4	-0.00680	-0.600***	-0.881***
	(0.126)	(0.107)	(0.121)
Income decile 5	-0.00710	-0.524***	-1.056***
	(0.128)	(0.139)	(0.162)
Income decile 6	0.518	-0.340*	-0.786***
	(0.365)	(0.182)	(0.187)
Income decile 7	-0.994***	-1.098***	-1.691***
	(0.370)	(0.367)	(0.382)
Income decile 8	-0.895	-0.760***	-1.372***
	(0.546)	(0.283)	(0.221)
Income decile 9		0.731***	0.366*
		(0.172)	(0.193)
Income decile 10	0.698***	0.0363	-0.245
	(0.178)	(0.148)	(0.168)
Income no answer	-0.213**	-0.760***	-1.197***
	(0.103)	(0.0830)	(0.100)
Secondary education	1.377***	0.856***	0.710***
	(0.150)	(0.165)	(0.127)
Tertiary education	2.505***	1.821***	1.657***
	(0.196)	(0.190)	(0.164)
Inactive	-1.935***	-1.389**	0.253
	(0.645)	(0.604)	(0.719)
Retired	1.074*	0.00247	0.704**

	(0.556)	(0.252)	(0.346)
Houseworker	1.591***	0.457**	1.390***
	(0.524)	(0.188)	(0.270)
Employed	1.192**	0.636***	1.579***
	(0.473)	(0.196)	(0.283)
relazione_stabile	0.0459*	0.175***	0.155***
	(0.0279)	(0.0435)	(0.0463)
Heart diseases	0.0526	-0.0417	0.326***
	(0.320)	(0.138)	(0.0977)
Hypertension	-0.337**	-0.566***	-0.591***
	(0.149)	(0.0983)	(0.126)
Lung Diseases	-0.383	-0.132	0.237
	(0.296)	(0.181)	(0.192)
Cancer	-0.593	-0.669**	-0.368
	(0.521)	(0.281)	(0.300)
Artritis	-0.140	-0.0108	0.145
	(0.131)	(0.110)	(0.0918)
Asthma	-0.440***	-0.273	-0.163
	(0.114)	(0.171)	(0.175)
Alzheimer/Dementia	0.851*	-0.181	0.0999
	(0.459)	(0.311)	(0.303)
Fibrocistis	-0.997**	-0.648***	-0.110
	(0.494)	(0.231)	(0.173)
Diabetes	-0.201**	-0.404***	-0.324**
	(0.0797)	(0.102)	(0.135)
Ostheoporosis	-0.557***	-0.248**	-0.559***
	(0.160)	(0.105)	(0.111)
Self-Assessed-Health (fair)	-0.368**	-0.571***	-0.927***
	(0.172)	(0.0860)	(0.0772)
Self-Assessed-Health (good)	-1.988**	-0.367	1.365***
	(0.815)	(0.640)	(0.418)
Self-Assessed-Health (very good)	0.871***	1.426***	1.500***
	(0.101)	(0.0813)	(0.102)
Self-Assessed-Health (excellent)	-1.580***	-1.603***	-1.851***

	(0.469)	(0.162)	(0.246)
Basilicata	0.0978*	0.476***	0.582***
	(0.0530)	(0.0678)	(0.0456)
Calabria	-0.226***	-0.228***	-0.223***
	(0.0323)	(0.0350)	(0.0263)
Campania	0.139***	-0.147*	-0.0393
	(0.0429)	(0.0858)	(0.0310)
Emilia-Romagna	-0.315***	0.123	0.226***
	(0.0685)	(0.176)	(0.0422)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	-0.279***	-0.127***	-0.214***
	(0.0605)	(0.0297)	(0.0247)
Lazio	-0.0985***	0.0743*	0.126***
	(0.0354)	(0.0382)	(0.0310)
Liguria	-0.0171	0.327***	0.441***
	(0.0494)	(0.0875)	(0.0444)
Lombardia	-0.153***	0.231***	0.317***
	(0.0376)	(0.0597)	(0.0279)
Marche	-0.263***	0.0515	0.346***
	(0.0524)	(0.0409)	(0.0351)
Molise	-0.271***	0.355***	0.170***
	(0.0770)	(0.0671)	(0.0556)
Piemonte	-0.0996*	0.266***	0.234***
	(0.0584)	(0.0879)	(0.0340)
Puglia	0.0629**	0.0335	0.0703***
	(0.0264)	(0.0398)	(0.0202)
Sardegna	-0.218***	0.121***	0.0849***
	(0.0446)	(0.0289)	(0.0324)
Sicilia	-0.0532	0.360***	0.208***
	(0.0358)	(0.0480)	(0.0203)
Toscana	-0.195***	0.138***	0.108***
	(0.0301)	(0.0352)	(0.0185)
Trentino-Alto-Adige	-0.153***	0.0214	-0.0999***
	(0.0331)	(0.0170)	(0.0295)
Umbria	-0.105**	0.152***	0.364***

		(0.0452)	(0.0284)	(0.0294)
Valle d'Aosta		0.0389	0.264***	-0.0626
		(0.0589)	(0.0245)	(0.0455)
Veneto		-0.350***	0.150***	0.104***
		(0.0287)	(0.0178)	(0.0172)
/cut1		-7.355***	-7.100***	-7.415***
		(1.181)	(0.526)	(0.561)
/cut2		-5.251***	-4.563***	-5.202***
		(0.955)	(0.511)	(0.564)
/cut3		-2.851***	-2.866***	-3.368***
		(0.860)	(0.441)	(0.483)
/cut4		-0.978	-1.426***	-1.663***
		(0.877)	(0.427)	(0.434)
/cut5		0.319	0.0757	-0.144
		(0.890)	(0.419)	(0.421)
/cut6		2.176**	1.646***	1.535***
		(0.904)	(0.418)	(0.428)
/cut7		5.199***	4.371***	4.271***
		(0.931)	(0.433)	(0.443)
/cut8		8.435***	6.371***	6.324***
		(0.977)	(0.520)	(0.533)
Log likelihood	-3440.945		-6517.255	-6527.636
Observations		2,551	4,556	4,663

Mean regional/education libertarian: average regional/education level sahre of libertarians. Mean regional/education utilitarian: average regional/education level sahre of utilitarians; Mean regional/education communitarian: average regional/education level share of communitarians. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9 Falsification test (very satisfied dependent variable)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES			
Mean regional/education libertarian	-1.248		
	(1.171)		
Mean regional/education utilitarian		1.344	
		(1.484)	
Mean regional/education communitarian			0.283
			(1.173)
Libertarian		-0.779***	-0.750***
		(0.112)	(0.116)
Utilitarian	-0.647***		-0.569***
	(0.193)		(0.154)
Communitarian	0.503**	0.450**	
	(0.196)	(0.177)	
Age	-0.0650**	-0.0688***	-0.0872***
	(0.0296)	(0.0211)	(0.0183)
$[Age]^2$	0.000948***	0.00104***	0.00122***
	(0.000329)	(0.000214)	(0.000202)
Female	0.398**	0.168	0.280**
	(0.181)	(0.113)	(0.121)
Income decile 2	1.257***	-0.422**	-1.253***
	(0.368)	(0.189)	(0.216)
Income decile 3	0.331*	-0.834***	-1.360***
	(0.170)	(0.141)	(0.157)
Income decile 4	0.117	-0.955***	-1.419***
	(0.182)	(0.200)	(0.226)
Income decile 5	0.0590	-1.097***	-1.797***
	(0.332)	(0.280)	(0.296)
Income decile 6	1.679**	-0.544	-1.179***
	(0.800)	(0.336)	(0.274)
Income decile 7	-	-	-

Income decile 8	-	-	-
Income decile 8	-	-	-
Income decile 10			
Income no answer	-0.0258	-1.129***	-1.777***
	(0.225)	(0.134)	(0.125)
Secondary education	1.695***	1.065***	0.989***
	(0.177)	(0.189)	(0.110)
Tertiary education	2.332***	1.589***	1.459***
	(0.322)	(0.288)	(0.199)
Inactive	-2.067***	-1.853***	-0.766**
	(0.553)	(0.432)	(0.356)
Retired	0.322	-0.656**	-0.270
	(0.362)	(0.269)	(0.378)
Houseworker	1.565***	0.355	1.067***
	(0.310)	(0.246)	(0.273)
Employed	0.966***	0.610***	1.236***
	(0.262)	(0.164)	(0.225)
Stable relationship	0.265***	0.328***	0.325***
	(0.0631)	(0.0553)	(0.0627)
Heart diseases	-0.238	-0.689***	-0.446
	(0.541)	(0.257)	(0.284)
Hypertension	-0.684***	-0.878***	-0.924***
	(0.179)	(0.111)	(0.145)
Lung Diseases	-0.623	-0.241	0.419*
	(0.457)	(0.244)	(0.245)
Cancer	-0.378	-0.255	0.211
	(0.835)	(0.438)	(0.384)
Artritis	-0.285*	-0.0511	0.227*
	(0.164)	(0.142)	(0.137)
Asthma	-0.555***	-0.242	-0.126

	(0.182)	(0.267)	(0.240)
Alzheimer/Dementia	1.516**	-0.620	-0.204
	(0.758)	(0.664)	(0.583)
Fibrocistis	-1.256	-1.220**	-0.881**
	(0.768)	(0.484)	(0.416)
Diabetes	-0.205	-0.496***	-0.596***
	(0.155)	(0.143)	(0.207)
Ostheoporosis	-0.574***	-0.0894	-0.377***
	(0.184)	(0.137)	(0.139)
Self-Assessed-Health (fair)	-0.622**	-0.524***	-1.037***
	(0.249)	(0.126)	(0.148)
Self-Assessed-Health (good)	-1.980***	-0.979**	0.384
	(0.504)	(0.414)	(0.466)
Self-Assessed-Health (very good)	1.074***	1.922***	2.035***
	(0.204)	(0.166)	(0.172)
Self-Assessed-Health (excellent)	-1.806**	-1.267***	-1.624***
	(0.751)	(0.322)	(0.401)
Basilicata	0.409***	0.478***	0.451***
	(0.0684)	(0.107)	(0.0663)
Calabria	-0.170**	-0.329***	-0.273***
	(0.0670)	(0.0550)	(0.0337)
Campania	0.0402	-0.171	0.0536
	(0.0811)	(0.154)	(0.0699)
Emilia-Romagna	0.0162	0.371	0.636***
	(0.132)	(0.314)	(0.109)
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia	-0.215*	-0.172***	-0.311***
	(0.111)	(0.0298)	(0.0310)
Lazio	0.101	0.283***	0.366***
	(0.0655)	(0.0692)	(0.0382)
Liguria	0.714***	0.711***	0.937***
	(0.0995)	(0.145)	(0.106)
Lombardia	0.0606	0.241**	0.410***
	(0.0831)	(0.0961)	(0.0473)
Marche	-0.0588	-0.0652	0.281***

	(0.0970)	(0.0706)	(0.0567)
Molise	-0.149*	0.309***	0.192***
	(0.0845)	(0.0944)	(0.0569)
Piemonte	0.529***	0.408***	0.571***
	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.0636)
Puglia	0.228***	0.0727	0.0147
	(0.0642)	(0.0750)	(0.0287)
Sardegna	-0.000250	0.249***	0.472***
	(0.0589)	(0.0258)	(0.0596)
Sicilia	0.0900	0.219***	0.172***
	(0.0822)	(0.0849)	(0.0265)
Toscana	-0.410***	0.0399	0.0293
	(0.0646)	(0.0645)	(0.0248)
Trentino-Alto-Adige	-0.285***	0.0238	-0.151***
	(0.0844)	(0.0306)	(0.0401)
Umbria	0.0870	0.216***	0.512***
	(0.100)	(0.0399)	(0.0346)
Valle d'Aosta	0.123	0.242***	-0.161**
	(0.0921)	(0.0263)	(0.0672)
Veneto	-0.271***	0.0813**	-0.0227
	(0.0383)	(0.0324)	(0.0213)
Constant	-0.509	-0.550	0.0448
	(0.864)	(0.526)	(0.457)
Log likelihood	-1071.034	-2084.414	-1958.728
Observations	2,512	4,421	4,534

Very satisfied: (0/1) dummy taking value one when life satisfaction higher than 6. Mean regional/education libertarian: average regional/education level sahre of libertarians. Mean regional/education utilitarian: average regional/education level sahre of utilitarians; Mean regional/education communitarian: average regional/education level share of communitarians. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.